Detection and authorization already live in your SIEM, EDR, PAM, and IAM. //AIRGAPT adds the enforcement-and-evidence layer beneath them: when your tools detect or authorize, //AIRGAPT enforces the boundary and returns a hardware-signed, tamper-evident record of what happened.
Every "No" in an //AIRGAPT column is intentional architecture, not a gap. Every "No" in a vendor column is their design choice, not a flaw. The stack works because each layer keeps to its purpose.
Your SIEM detects; //AIRGAPT enforces the boundary at the device and returns a signed, tamper-evident evidence record.
* The July 2024 incident illustrates that a single agent layer is itself a dependency; //AIRGAPT provides a separate, hardware-anchored evidence path.
Your EDR detects; //AIRGAPT enforces the boundary at the device and returns a signed, tamper-evident evidence record.
Your PAM authorizes; //AIRGAPT enforces the boundary at the device and returns a signed, tamper-evident consent record.
Your IdP authorizes; //AIRGAPT enforces the boundary at the device and returns a signed, tamper-evident consent record.
//AIRGAPT adds a tamper-evident enforcement-and-evidence layer beneath the tools you already run.
Detect → Authorize → Enforce. Most enterprise stacks have the first two. //AIRGAPT is the third.
Integrate //AIRGAPT on top of your existing SIEM and PAM investment. No new hardware. No rip-and-replace.
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